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Discourse and the 
Democratic Ideal* 
KATHLEEN HALL JAMIESON 
Professor of Communication and Dean 
Annenberg School for Communication 
University of Pennsylvania T Nhe "most characteristic function of a man of practical wisdom is to 
deliberate well"1 wrote the author of the rhetoric text that anchors 
Western discussion of public discourse. In the society envisioned 
by Aristotle, the end of rhetoric was judgment (krinate). 
Two tendencies in contemporary presidential campaigns deflect us 
from the Aristotelian ideal. First, by depriving us of access to a mind at 
work expressing itself in language, the widespread use of ghostwriters 
clouds our ability to judge the ethos of the speaker. At the same time, the 
abbreviated forms that now characterize campaigns minimize both delib- 
erative rhetoric and its mainstay, traditional argument. Lost in the pro- 
cess is some of the electorate's ability to judge the person who would be 
president and the merits of the policies he forecasts. 
The shifts in how our leaders communicate affect heir ability to lead 
as well. Throughout history, theorists of communication have noted the 
educative value of forging thought into language. Most have agreed with 
Francis Bacon that "reading maketh a full man; conference a ready man 
and writing an exact man." What is less noted is the value of sustained 
contact with a set of ideas. As he considered their meaning in speech 
after speech, on occasion upon occasion, Daniel Webster's concept of 
both the Constitution and the law matured. So too did Lincoln's grasp 
of the meaning of war, union, liberty, and country. 
The Gettysburg Address expresses an intricate universe in memorable 
language because Lincoln had absorbed the legacy of the founders, 
understood the principles on which government must rest, and had 
fathomed the importance of fraternity to the body politic. Had his earlier 
speeches been ghosted, his address at Gettysburg might have been 
neither little noted nor long remembered. 
* Read 13 November 1992. Portions of this article are drawn from the author's books 
Dirty Politics (Oxford, 1992) and Eloquence in an Electronic Age (Oxford, 1988). 
1 See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1141b, 7-14. 
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Likewise, Jefferson's precis of American principles in the Declaration 
of Independence is the by-product of years of thought, reading, and 
writing on these same issues. In Woodrow Wilson's writings as a college 
professor, we see the Fourteen Points foreshadowed. Had he not con- 
sidered such matters repeatedly, again and again faced a blank page, 
pen in hand, and learned from critics, opponents, and audiences who 
responded to the early incarnations, I suspect that the reasons and lan- 
guage for which that war was fought would have been not only different 
but less memorable. 
A contemporary search for a Wilson, a Lincoln, or a Jefferson yields 
a very small number of public figures willing and able to undertake the 
difficult process of crystallizing thought in language. One such was 
Martin Luther King, Jr., whose "I Have a Dream" speech embodied lived 
ideas forecast in earlier speeches, letters, and essays. In jail, at the pulpit, 
in rallies, King had reached for the language that would invite audiences 
to understand the common humanity of blacks and whites and the 
meaning of making real the promises of democracy. The eloquence of 
that speech flows from King's command of a rich rhetorical tradition, 
from his ability to voice his own and his people's convictions, and from 
his unrelenting struggle to enable his audiences to witness the world as 
he had come to experience it. 
When a politician enters a forum clutching a text, public discussion 
is likely to be replaced by declamation. In the process, the existential risk 
that once accompanied public argument is lost and with it the suscepti- 
bility to persuasion that comes of mind confronting mind rather than 
script confronting script. 
By divorcing the speaking of ideas from conception of them, ghost- 
writing also clouds our ability to know the person who would lead. 
Where Walt Whitman could say of his work, "Who touches this touches 
a man," President Bill Clinton might more appropriately say, "Who 
touches this speech, touches David Kusnet, Paul Begala, Bob Boorstin 
and, perhaps, Bill Clinton." 
Ghosting not only enables leaders to conceal what we need revealed 
but also, by providing words on demand, transfers policy-shaping powers 
to individuals more skilled in the nuances of language than legislation. 
In a White House haunted by ghosts, those elected to lead are inclined 
to cede constitutionally specified powers to those selected to write. 
A speaker's problems are compounded when the sentences are the 
product of a covey of writers. When a speaker's words are scripted by a 
conglomerate of speechwriters, subtle but detectably different personae 
begin to speak through the mouth of the same person, a fact hardly re- 
assuring to those seeking to find the person behind the public candidate. 
George Bush's 1988 acceptance speech at the Republican National Con- 
vention combines the subtle lyricism of poet turned speechwriter Peggy 
Noonan with the punch-in-the-gut one-liners of media adviser Roger 
Ailes. It is jarring to hear Bush's gentle elegy to the burdens of the office 
in one breath and in the next, in 1988, "Read my lips, no new taxes," and 
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in 1992, "My dog Millie knows more about foreign policy than either of 
those bozos." 
Just as the ghostwriter makes it more difficult for us to judge the can- 
didates through their speech, the demise of the speech as a rhetorical 
form makes it more difficult o weigh the merits of their proposals. The 
televised general election speech to the national audience actually disap- 
peared in 1988. With few exceptions prior to that year, candidates used 
their convention speeches to forecast the themes of the fall campaign and 
their election eve speech to recap those themes. In the process, that final 
campaign speech gave the candidates the opportunity to step back from 
the harsh language and divisive appeals of the campaign to employ a 
rhetoric forecasting governance. In 1988 neither major party candidate 
delivered the traditional half-hour statement to the nation. Nor did the 
final threesome in 1992. 
A good public policy speech defines the nature of the country's prob- 
lems, explains their origins, lays out the available solutions, argues the 
comparative advantages of one over the others, shows how this solution 
addresses the causes, and then dramatizes the solution in ways that 
make it memorable to a mass audience. At no point in the fall 1992 cam- 
paign did either candidate deliver such a speech in prime time over tele- 
vision to the American people. 
How can I make such a claim when the world knows that Independent 
H. Ross Perot spent over thirty million dollars of his own money to offer 
half-hour presentations to the nation? Because those half-hour exposi- 
tions were not speeches in any traditional sense of the word. 
What the billionaire from Dallas delivered were "phantom speeches." 
I borrow the notion from that used to describe an amputee's sense that 
the missing limb is still twitching, itching, and attached. Those ran- 
sacking their memory for a real policy speech can harken back to LBJ's 
"We Shall Overcome" speech to Congress, JFK's speech on disarmament 
at American University, or any of FDR's fireside chats. More recently, 
Ronald Reagan commemorated D-Day memorably in the ceremonial 
form (epideictic) at which he excelled. 
And as recently as the campaigns of 1960 and 1980 one can find such 
policy speeches in the repertoires of the major candidates. But in recent 
years the spot has replaced the speech as the preferred rhetorical form of 
the campaign. Serious policy speeches are reserved for governance. Indeed, 
such speech acts as the inaugural, the state of the union address, and the 
veto message are staples of governance. The speech has become a form 
through which presidents govem but in which candidates do not campaign. 
Where campaign speeches assert, the rhetoric of governance argues. 
Because they employed a length we usually associate with a televised 
presidential address, were delivered by a candidate directly to camera, 
and offered chart after chart of what appeared to be evidence, we mis- 
took Ross Perot's phantom speeches for the real thing. Ross Perot's half 
hour "infomercials" on the economy, on his upbringing and accomplish- 
ments, and on the weaknesses of his opponents were spot ads knit 
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together with such transitional headlines as "Oops" and "The Dead 
Farmer:" 
Those who mistook Perot's string of spots for speeches confused data 
with evidence. In chart after chart, Perot offered histograms and graphs 
undignified by an argumentative structure that would knit them into 
argument. More interesting is the fact that the data indicating a pervasive 
problem were structurally unrelated to the solutions he offered. 
Where Perot served up the phantom speech, Clinton offered home- 
movies and a family album. Where Perot aggregated charts, Clinton 
sewed biographical snapshots into a convention film and then patched 
it together with scenes from the bus tours to create a half-hour election 
eve ad. 
The bio-ad invites us to assume that because we can identify with 
Clinton's biography, we should be willing to trust his undisclosed plans 
on health care, education, and the economy. 
"I was born in a little town called Hope, Ark., three months after my 
father died," begins a representative portion of the video. 
I remember living in that old two-story house where I lived with my grand- 
parents. I remember going to my grandfather's grocery store and a big jar of 
Jackson cookies that were on the shelf. It was a wonderful little, small town 
where you know it seemed that everybody knew everybody else. And, ah, it was 
segregated like all Southern towns were then. And I remember my grandmother 
and grandfather opposing the closing of Central High School to keep Black stu- 
dents out. They were for integrating the schools. It was interesting. My grand- 
father had a grade school education. And my grandmother had graduated from 
high school, from a tiny little school out in Badkar Arkansas. 
Clinton's wife, Hillary appears and says, 
His grandmother just valued education above all else. And from the time Bill was 
in a high chair she had you know like playing cards tacked up on the drapes in 
the kitchen area where she fed Bill. She would tell him what the numbers were 
and she would read to him all the time so that he was able to read at a really 
young age in part because his grandmother valued it so much and helped him 
so much. 
The camera cuts back to the presidential aspirant. "They didn't go 
around and see the world and become broadminded; they did it out of 
the depths of their experience and their heart and I was always really 
proud of them." 
What of the specifics of a health, education or economic growth plan? 
In 1963 that I went to Washington and met President Kennedy at the Boys 
Nation Program. 
And I remember just, uh, thinking what an incredible country this was-that 
somebody like me, y'know, had no money or anything would be given the oppor- 
tunity to meet the President. 
That's when I decided that I really could do public service, 'cause I cared so 
much about people. And I worked my way through law school, with part-time 
jobs, anything I could find. 
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After I graduated, I really didn't care about making a lot of money. I just 
wanted to go home and see if I could make a difference. We've worked in edu- 
cation and health care, to create jobs, and we've made real progress. 
Now it's exhilarating to me to think that as President, I can help to change 
all our people's lives for the better, and bring hope back to the American dream. 
The speech is not the only victim of contemporary politics. With it has 
gone its integral element: argument. The notion that the end of rhetoric 
is judgment presupposes that rhetoric consists of argument-statement 
and proof. 
Morselized ads and newsbites consist instead of statement alone, a 
move that invites us to judge the merit of the claim on the ethos of the 
speaker or the emotional appeals (pathos) - enwrapping the claim. In the 
process, appeal to reason (logos) one of Aristotle's prime means of 
persuasion-is lost. With it goes some of the audience's ability to judge. 
Network news accustoms audiences to assertion, not argument. Over 
time it reinforces the notion that politics is about visceral identification 
and apposition, not complex problems and their solutions. It also accus- 
toms politicians and quoted academics to think and speak in assertions. 
I must confess that I speak from experience. In 1978 I was invited to 
appear on network television for the first ime. Wanting to do a good job, 
I was particularly careful in the pre-interview to define my terms and lay 
out the available evidence for my arguments. After talking with me for 
more than a half hour, the producer of the segment laughed and said, 
"Look professor, I know you are an expert in this area. That's why we 
want you on the show. But when we say you are an expert, it means you 
are an expert. You don't have to tell us how you got to your conclusions, 
just give us the bottom line." 
With few exceptions, "soundbite" is a synonym for "assertion." Whether 
it is warranted by evidence cannot usually be known by the reader or 
viewer. By certifying the interviewee as an "expert," reporters ask their 
audiences to take the existence of evidence on faith. 
Speechwriters produce and candidates deliver what is rewarded with 
newsplay. Over time, assertion-not argument-has become the norm 
for candidate speeches. Indeed, the goal of the campaign comes to be 
getting the same soundbite into the soundbite hole of each of the net- 
works. Interestingly, that soundbite is not necessarily the candidate's cen- 
tral idea. More often it is an attack on an opponent. 
If the goal of a speech is producing a widgetlike soundbite in a prefab- 
ricated environment, then some facets of argument fall to the wayside. 
One does not dare note the legitimacy of anything the opponent has 
done or said. Doing so runs the risk that that moment of equanimity will 
be the one played on news. Banned, too, is discussion of substantive sim- 
ilarities between candidates. One does not accurately summarize the 
case for the other side, even if only to rebut it. Nor ought one to tie evi- 
dence to one's claims lest in the process the claim expands beyond the 
size of the soundbite slot and as a result is shunted aside. "Stepping on 
This content downloaded from 128.91.58.254 on Wed, 2 Apr 2014 12:41:04 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
DISCOURSE AND THE DEMOCRATIC IDEAL 337 
your own message" is shorthand for letting the reporters or the opposing 
campaign shape the content of your soundbite. 
I don't mean to suggest that short assertive statements are necessarily 
superficial. When a voter is fully informed about an issue and needs only 
to know whether the candidate is of a like mind, such assertions as "I 
favor Roe v. Wade" or "I favor the death penalty for drug lords" are useful 
and efficient. But if the voter is seeking an understanding of the rationale 
that has led the candidate to this conclusion or is trying to determine 
which position to embrace, soundbites aren't very helpful. They can tell 
a voter what a candidate believes, but not why. And many issues are too 
complex to be freeze-dried into a slogan and a smile. 
The saga of Clinton from boyhood to bus tour and Perot's charts from 
the heart functioned as surrogates for the speech. Where Perot's half 
hours on the deficit offered cascades of evidence anchored only in the 
mantra, "We are in deep voo-doo," a key Bush ad offered claims but only 
pseudo evidence. In the ad, whose words are lifted from Bush's conven- 
tion speech, the incumbent president says: 
The world is in transition. The defining challenge of the 90's is to win the eco- 
nomic competition. To win the peace, we must be a military superpower, an 
economic superpower and an export superpower. In this election you'll hear two 
ways of how to do this. Theirs is to look inward. Ours is to look forward, prepare 
our people to compete, to save and invest so we can win. 
Here's what I'm fighting for: open markets for American products, lower Gov- 
ernment spending, tax relief, opportunities for small business, legal and health 
reform, job training and new schools built on competition, ready for the 21st 
century. 
Set in cold print, these sentences read as assertions. They also imply 
stark differences among the candidates where in fact none exist. Perot 
and Clinton can chant these incantations as surely as can the incumbent 
president. 
But what interests me about this ad is our research that suggests that 
its pictures function as evidence for audiences. Where Perot offered 
phantom speeches, Bush is offering phantom evidence. It takes the form 
of evocative pictures of children pledging allegiance to the flag, cargo 
ships being loaded, and missiles being launched. Audiences that see the 
ad without these pictures recognize that Bush is making a series of asser- 
tions. Audiences that see the ad's pictures are more likely to report that 
Bush has shown that he has met those goals or indicated how he will 
meet them in the future. 
What is important about this difference in perception, of course, is 
that the pictures have no evidentiary weight whatsoever. Because they 
appear where evidence is supposed to appear- after a claim- and 
because they are rapidly intercut-we mistake the sequence, the form if 
you will, for what it is not-argument. 
All of this should matter because our system is designed to work 
through the clash of ideas, a clash best achieved through extended argu- 
ment. It was through a process of trial and error that the country came 
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to defend the free play of argument in politics. The Sedition Act of 1798, 
passed by the Federalists, made it a Federal crime to "write, utter or pub- 
lish . . . any false, scandalous and malicious writing . . . against the gov- 
ernment of the United States." During the election of 1800, Federalist Sec- 
retary of State Timothy Pickering used this act to prosecute opposition 
Republican newspapers. The government "depends for its existence 
upon the good will of the people," argued defenders of the act. "That 
good will is maintained by their good opinion But, how is that good 
opinion to be preserved, if wicked and unprincipled men, men of inor- 
dinate and desperate ambition, are allowed to state facts to the people 
which are not true, which they know at the time to be false, and which 
are stated with the criminal intention of bringing the Government into 
disrepute among the people." 
By contrast, the Republicans held that in the clash of ideas, true 
opinion would prevail. The state could not be so menaced by words, they 
argued, as to justify the harm that could result from their suppression. 
After that brief experiment in limiting political debate, the founders came 
out for a free and open exchange of ideas. 
The ideal was amply precedented. The philosopher Immanuel Kant 
termed it "the transcendental principle of publicness." "Let Truth and 
Falsehood grapple,' argued Milton in "Areopagitica," "who ever knew 
truth put to the worse in a free and open encounter:" 
The argument for what some have called the "marketplace of ideas" 
also drew strength from the theorizing of two of the fathers of the Rev- 
olution: Benjamin Franklin and Thomas Jefferson. In his 1731 'Apology 
for Printers," Franklin noted that "both Sides ought equally to have the 
Advantage of being heard by the Publick." In 1801, Jefferson's inaugural 
reflected his support for the concept, "If there be any among us who 
would wish to dissolve this union or to change its republican form," he 
wrote, "let them stand undisturbed, as monuments of the safety with 
which error of opinion may be tolerated, where reason is left free to 
combat it." The protections of political speech that govern contemporary 
politics are a legacy of this view. 
Increasingly these protections are safeguarding soundbites and snap- 
shots rather than speeches, protecting assertions rather than arguments, 
and defending phantom forms masquerading as proof. Increasingly the 
end sought by political discourse is not judgment but visceral identifica- 
tion. Were Jefferson and Franklin with us today, I suspect these tenden- 
cies would be the subject of their concern. 
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